BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 4

Article 6

11-1-1980

The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An
Examination of The Legitimacy of the Supreme
Court Abortion Decisions
Lynn D. Wardle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons
Recommended Citation
Lynn D. Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of The Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions,
1980 BYU L. Rev. 811 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss4/6

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An
Examination of The Legitimacy of the Supreme
Court Abortion Decisions.
Lynn D. Wardle*
I. THEGAPBETWEEN
LAWAND MORAL
ORDER
A. "The Gap"
During the Law Teachers Seminar on Law, Society, and
Moral Order at Syracuse University in 1979, Professor Richard
Schwartz presented a graphic image of "the gap" that may exist
between law and moral order in society. He suggested that a circle can be drawn to represent the moral order of a given society.
Another circle can be drawn to represent the law of that same
society. Sometimes, or at least regarding some issues, the two
circles will overlap substantially. At other times, or regarding
other issues, they will be totally disconnected with a gap between them. (See Figure 1.) This is "the gap."
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This graphic representation of the relationship between law
and moral order has certain shortcomings. To begin with, the
concepts of "moral order" and "law" are difficult to describe
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. The author acknowledges
the contribution of the scholars who commented on the draft of this paper that was
presented a t the A.S.U. and B.Y.U. Symposia on Law and Morality, and particularly
wishes to thank Professor Richard D.Schwartz, Professor William Rich, Professor Richard Cosgrove, Dean Martin Hickman and Dean James Clayton for their valuable
criticism.
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precisely. The term "moral order" refers to the core values and
fundamental beliefs which comprise the basic mores of a particular society at a particular time; it is a positive morality as distinct from the critical morality of phi10sophers.l The term "law"
refers to positive law; the regulations of social behavior that are
created and enforced by the government. But, "moral order" in
modern society is so complex, so protean, and so eclectic that a
static, two-dimensional representation obviously cannot adequately represent it for all purposes. Likewise, it is simplistic to
represent "the law" with a precise geometric figure when our legal system is characterized by such amorphous variables as federalism, prosecutorial discretion, jury trial, and the common law
process. And, of course, it is extremely difficult to gauge the relative positions of these two planets in the universe of positive
morality.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this diagram of "the
gap" is an effective way to illustrate the following basic premises
concerning the role of law in modem society.
1)There is a moral order in society? Out of the many different
and often conflicting values of the individuals and institutions
that make up society may emerge a dominant moral position, a
"core" of the moral order. The position of this core is dynamic,
and as it changes the moral order of society moves in the direction of that change?
2) There is a moral content to the law.' The moral content of
law also changes over time, and as it changes the law moves in
the direction of that change.6
3) The moral content of the law and moral order in society are
seldom identical.@
1. The terms ''positive morality" and "critical morality" were used by Professor Jeffrey Murphy, a participant in the A.S.U. Symposium, to distinguish between the social
mores which are the subject matter of h f - r
Schwartz's "moral order" and the more
reflective type of morality with which Professor Murphy and other philosophers are primarily concerned.
2. See Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 Soc. RESEARCH
42 (1971);Schwartz, Mom1 Order and Society of Law: Trends, Problems, and Prospects,
4 ANN.REV. SOC. 577 (1978);See also K. LLEWBUYN, THE BWLE BUSH107-18(1960).
3. See, e.g., E. m,AN INTRODUCFION
TO LEG&REASONING
56 (1948).
4. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Lcuo-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Hmv. L.
REV. 630 (1958);Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Hmv. L.
REV. 593 (1958).
5. A. NORTH,
THE SUPREMECOUKF:
JUDICIAL
PROCESSAND JUDICIAL
POLITICS
169
(1966).
6. See Bohannan, The DifferingRealms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGY
pt. 2, at
33,37 (1965).
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4) A natural and necessary afbity exists between the two
"bodies" of law and moral order.?
5) When there is a gap between the moral order of society and
the law, some movement to close the gap is likely? (The law
will move closer to the moral order of society, or the moral order will move closer to the law, or each will move toward the
other.) The likelihood of movement to close the gap between
law and moral order depends upon the size of the gap between
the two bodies and the perceived significance of the subject
matter concerning which the gap exists.'

B. Legitimacy

Our discussions at the Law Teachers Seminar regarding
"the gap" stimulated my interest in the legitimacy of law and of
our legal order system in modern society. The term "legitimacy"
is used here to mean accepted or sanctioned by society; within
the limits of the social system. Thus, law is "legitimate" only if
"the gap" is not too great.
In a democracy, law must be within the field of gravity of
the moral order of society to be legitimate; there are limits on
the size of the gap that a democracy can tolerate. The power of
the law and legal institutions to function effectively in a democracy depends, ultimately, upon the allegiance of the citizen-subjects. The justice system is capable of responding to the disobedience of only a small number of citizens to specific laws. Thus,
the respect and loyalty of society-at-large are essential to the legitimacy of law and of the legal order system.
When the gap between any law and the moral order concerning the subject matter of that law becomes too great, there
is danger that that law will lose its legitimacy. There is also the
danger, at least in a democracy, that the legal system will lose its
legitimacy. And when the gap is caused by the judiciary, there is
great danger that the judiciary will lose its legitimacy.
C. Judicial Activism
The action of judges which changes the moral position of
the law so as to create or close a significant gap between law and
7. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 589.
8. See Walster, Bershheid, & Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J .
PERSONALITY
& SOC.PSYCH.
151 (1973).
9. See J. COHEN,
R. ROBSON,
& A. BATES,
PARENTAL
AUTHORITY:
THECOMMUNITY
AND THE LAW195, 198 (1958).
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moral order in society is referred to as judicial activism. (This
paper focuses on gap-creating judicial activism.)
In our constitutional system of checks and balances, the
functions performed by the judiciary are unquestionably crucial
even if they are at times ambiguous. (The preservation of the
balancing process that prevents the political branches of government from consuming each other, and democracy as well, certainly is one of them.lO)Yet the American judiciary, historically,
and the federal judiciary, constitutionally, are "independent"
and politically unresponsive. Thus, although the dangers of judicial activism to the legitimacy of the law, the courts, and the
legal order system are relatively clear, the appropriate limits on
the activist role of the judiciary are not.
Traditionally, the judiciary has been the least active governmental agent of social change. When the United States Constitution was proposed, its supporters argued that the judiciary
would be "the least dangerous" branch of the federal government." And historically the American judiciary has been a
classically conservative social force-a preserver and protector of
the traditional, the established, and the status quo. Thus, the
judiciary has been an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary,
institution.12
But following the Civil War, during the Radical Republican
Era of federal expansionism, the American judiciary assumed a
more active policy-forming role than it previously had taken.
Between 1890 and 1934, the United States Supreme Court invalidated literally hundreds of progressive economic and social regulations in pursuit of "economic due process," and some state
supreme courts were even more aggressive.lS Although such judicial activism has often been condemned by scholars and judges,
such criticisms have more frequently been indicative of the
critics' dislike of the social policies effectuated rather than any
consistent concern over the expanded social-policy-shaping role
assumed by the judiciary.14
An activist role for the judiciary now appears to be firmly
10. See generally J. BY,
DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST
(1980).
NO.78 (A. Hamilton).
11. THEFEDERALIST
THB LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH(1962);S. SCHEINCOLD,
12. See generally A. BICKKL,
THE POLITICS
OF RIGHTS
(1974); Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L.
REV.1 (1977).
PROCESSES
OF C O N ~ O N A
DECISIONMAKING
L
738 (1975).
13. See P. BREST,
14. See A. BICKKL,
supra note 12, at 45-46; Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92
HARV.L. REV.5, 15-16 (1978).
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entrenched in our legal and political traditions. Yet there are
still ways in which discontent with judicial activism may surface.
The legitimacy of the institutions of the law may be subverted if
the legitimacy of the law created by judicial activism is in doubt.
And since this form of opposition is more subtle than direct attack on the role of the judiciary, it may prove to constitute the
more serious challenge to the dynamic interaction of the law and
moral order that is the foundation for our democratic society.
The judiciary unquestionably performs an essential role in
our democratic society. Therefore, if the legitimacy of the judiciary as an institution may be threatened when judicial activism
creates an intolerable gap between the law and the moral order
of society, then certainly this is a matter for serious study. In
the remainder of this paper I will examine the legitimacy of judicial activism in the context of the relationship between the law
and the moral order. I will first propose a framework of analysis
for determining when a judicially created gap is too great; I will
suggest three tolerance limits on legitimate judicial activism.
Secondly, I will apply that framework of analysis to one of the
most controversial subjects of recent judicial activism, the doctrine of abortion privacy; I will test my model to see whether it
can provide any useful perspectives about the legitimacy of the
abortion decisions.

The most significant challenges to the legitimacy of courtinitiated change in the law relate to three issues: (1) Whether
the new law is supported by an active and influential group
within the society; (2) whether the action of the court is perceived by the other branches of government as threatening their
own authority; and (3) whether the articulated justification for
the court's decision is credible? These three questions roughly
identify the tolerance limits for judicial activism.

A. Is The New Law Supported By An Active And
Influential Group Within Society?
The first inquiry asks whether or not the new law comes
within the "field of gravity" produced by the core moral order of
15. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 578. My three criteria roughly correspond to the
three factors identified by Professor Schwartz as contributing to the acceptance of legal
norms by society.
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society. Is there some active and influential group that can effectively offset any pressure that otherwise might be generated by
reversionary groups to resist the law-change or to pull the law
back in the direction of the existing moral order? If not, the new
law tends to be illegitimate.
Professor Schwartz indirectly suggested this limit on the legitimacy of judicial activism when he stated: "Instead of reflecting a general value concensus, law often implements the value
preferences of small groups who are either strategically placed
within the system or are able to bring power to bear from without."16 The same idea is also suggested by Stanley Diamond's
comments about the "structural opportunism" of early state
lawmaking authorities in deigning to "permit" in law what they
could not prohibit? He noted that early governmental systems
were able to grow in power by making strategically advantageous
alliances as conflicts arose which divided political society
internally.le
The need for law to be accepted by an influential group in
society in order to be legitimate is one of the primary assumptions that underlies Stuart Scheingold's work, The Politics of
Rights? In his chapters dealing with "Rights as Resources" and
"Legal Rights and Political Mobilization," he stresses the idea
that court-initiated law changes do not have significant force to
effect social change, but are important in stimulating responsive
groups within society to take political action to effectuate social
change.'O Scheingold emphasizes that judicial decisions alone are
not persuasive "to the elites who are most immediately responsible for making decisions for the polity. These elites are, however,
likely to respond to effectively organized interests, and legal
symbols can be usefully employed in behalf of political mobilizati~n."~'Accordingly, gap-producing judicial decisions must be
supported by a politically active group to prevent other mobilized groups, whose interests are negatively affected by the decisions, from overturning the law changes.
Thus, even though judges are not themselves politically responsive, our legal order is. Law in a democracy must represent
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 577-78. See also
See Diamond, supra note 2, at 48-50.
Id. at 62-64.
S. SCHNEINGOLD,
supra note 12.
See id. at 83-96, 131-48.
Id. at 148.

id. at 580, 581.
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the will, or at least the tolerance of society. To acquire legitimacy, then, court-initiated law changes must find support within
society at large-at least enough support to offset the reactionary forces that will be mobilized to resist both the law change
and its effect on moral order.ls

B. Is The Judicial Action Perceived By The Other Branches
Of Government As Threatening Their Authority?
In a two-tiered, tripartite system of government in which
the principles of federalism and separation of powers are constitutionally established, the action of any single branch of government that produces a significant, gap-opening change of law
must not be perceived by the other branches or units of government as threatening a usurpation of their authority or as representing a substantial infringment of their roles in governing society. Thus, the second limit on legitimate judicial activism
concerns whether or not the judiciary has exceeded its political
"jurisdiction" by making a particular change in law.
The "jurisdictional" limit on judicial activism poses a particularly delicate problem for the federal courts.u In cases in
which controversial social legislation has been sustained, the
United States Supreme Court has often emphasized that it cannot strike down duly enacted statutes simply "because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought."a4
The reasons for this limit on judicial "legislating" are many,
but three in particular should be mentioned here. The first reason is that, inasmuch as a court is not a politically responsive
branch of government, its "currency" of legitimate judicial activism is somewhat limited. Judicial decisions that create a gap be22. Legitimacy is also, at least partially, a function of time. With the passage of time
a law change acquires a presumption of legitimacy which enhances its acceptability.
Thus, even if a gap-creating law change is repugnant to most active groups in society, if
those to whom it is acceptable can prevent its outright rejection, the law change may
acquire legitimacy over time. That is, the group supporting the law change must at least
be able to neutralize reversionary interests and create an impasse-a temporary stagnation of the dynamic legitimation process. This may provide a continuing opportunity for
supporters of the legal change to rally support for the movement to a new moral order,
while the passage of time itself subtly enhances the legitimation of the new legal order.
supra note
23. See generally A. BICKEL,supra note 12, at 65-72, 183-97; A. NORTH,
5, at 169.
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), cited in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
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tween law and moral order carry a high "cost" in this rare "currency." As one commentator observed: "Perennial judicial policy
making arouses a dialectical progression: it eats away the expectations of neutrality that form the principal source of the courts'
moral support; long-continued judicial authoritarianism will ultimately destroy itself."26 The late Professor Lon Fuller argued
that legislative functions are "parasitic" when performed by the
courts because they sap the courts of their legitimacy?
The second reason is that for the court to assume an active
role in changing the morality institutionalized in the law duplicates the primary role of a competing branch of government,
and invites contention between co-equal departments of government. Thus, former California Supreme Court Chief Justice
Traynor, whose distinguished career often found him breaking
new ground, warned judges against usurping the legislative function when he observed:
[Sltudents of constitutional law will find valid grounds for difference as to how readily a court should arrive at a constitutional rule that nudges a legislature into social reform along
one expansive front or another. . . . Nevertheless there remains
widespread agreement that the court itself cannot be the engine of social reform. The very responsibilities of a judge as an
arbiter disqualify him as a crusader?'

Another highly respected state supreme court chief justice
echoed this sentiment when he wrote:
To the extent that courts perform their role as expected, their
decisions, even if unpopular, will have a greater chance of being accepted and followed by society. . . . [B]y maintaining a
conservative stance, the courts help to preserve the sense of
security and stability society requires. The more the other two
branches of government engage in the politics of change, the
greater the need for a stable and predictable judicial
branch. . . .
. . . If the courts deviate from their expected method of
decision-making and issue novel and creative decisions, the stability and security that society needs from the courts will
wane.s8
25. Friedma., The Courts And Social Policy, 216 NATION
467, 469 (1973).
26. Chayes, The Role Of The Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 Hmv. L. REV.
1281, 1304 (1976) (citing an unpublished manuscript written by Professor Lon Fuller).
27. Traynor, supra note 12, at 5.
28. Cameron, The Place For Judicial Activism On The Part Of A State's Highest

THE ABORTION DECISIONS

The concern that judicial activism duplicates the role of a
co-equal branch of government was well articulated by Justice
Powell in his concurring opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson:
There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. . . It seems to be that this
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political
decision which is currently in process of resolution does not
reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative
processes.
There are times when this Court, under our system, cannot avoid a constitutional decision on issues which normally
should be resolved by the elected representatives of the people.
But democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in
the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political
importance at the very time they are under consideration
within the prescribed constitutional processe~.~~

.

The third reason for imposing a "jurisdictional" limit on judicial activism is that by virtue of the method of selecting legislators and the legislative methods of operation, the legislature is
considerably better suited for the task of determining the moral
order of society and establishing it in law than is the judiciary.
As Justice Marshall observed in his dissenting opinion in a recent seventh amendment case:
Normally, in our system we leave the inevitable process of arbitrary linedrawing to the Legislative Branch, which is far better
equipped to make ad hoc compromises. In the past, we have
therefore given great deference to legislative decisions in cases
where the line must be drawn somewhere and cannot be precisely delineated by reference to prin~iple.~~

In a similar vein, Chief Justice Traynor wrote: "Even at his most
active, [a judge] must be alert to set limits on judicial creativity
sufEcient to preserve the distance between judicial analysis and
legislative innovati~n."~~
Court, 4 HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 279, 282 (1977) (emphasis added).
29. 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973).
30. Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 182-83 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. Traynor, supra note 12, at 2.
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Thus, judicial creation of social policy flies in the face of the
basic premises of constitutional government with its preference
for localized representative democracy." These concerns, and
others, create a competitive jurisdictional restraint on judicial

C. Is The Articulated Rationale For The Judicial Action
Credible?
This factor relates solely to law changes caused by the judiciary. It focuses on the principal characteristic of the judicial
decisionmaking process that distinguishes it from the legislative
and executive processes. The question here is whether the legal
analysis that constitutes the body of the formal judicial opinion
provides a credible justification for the change in the law.
Legal analysis is a process of reasoning by analogy to established authority and accepted principle^.^ It defines the boundaries of the range of decisions which the judge can make, for all
judicial decisions must ultimately be justified by legal analysis.
Accordingly, if the decision of a court cannot be credibly defended by legal analysis, it has failed this standard of legitimacy.
This principle is so fundamental that it is occasionally overlooked. However, legal analysis is the essence of the judicial process, and making principled decisions that are explained credi32. See generally Fordham, Judicial Policy-Making At Legislative Expense, 34

GEO.WASH.
L. REV.829 (1966).
33. The significance of this "jurisdictional" limit on the ability of courta to change
law ought not to be overstated. As a practical matter, it is very difticult for Congress or
the President to check judicial activism. Although Supreme Court negation of legislative
and executive activism is now (175 years after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch)
137 (1803)) an accepted tradition in this country, immediate response by the political
branches to judicial activism is not as well accepted. For example, during the Watergate
crisis the sitting President had the greatest of all self-interested reasons to defy the judiciary, yet he did not do so (presumably, for fear of public response). The fact that a
crisis atmosphere existed for several weeks during the Watergate scandal underscores the
point that direct confrontation by a political branch of government with the Court is
unusual, uncomfortable, and especially undesirable.
Constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court have been overturned through the
political process only four times in the entire history of the nation. See J. Choper, JmrCUL REVIEWISND THE NATIONAL
P O L ~ CPROCE~S
AC
421 n.133 (1980). (Thishistorical fact,
however, may merely indicate that the federal judiciary has been exceptionally successful
in judging how far they can go without violating this limit on their authority.) Thus,
even though a strong negative reaction of the political branches of government must be a
matter of concern to the federal courts, rarely has judicial activism been denied legitimacy on this basis alone.
34. See E. LEVI,supra note 3, at 1-3.
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bly is the heart of the judicial function. As Professor Bickel
declared, a court "can only decide the case before it, giving reasons which rise to the dignity of principle . . . ."56 He further
observed that "[wlhen it strikes down legislative policy, the
Court must act rigorously on principle, else it undermines the
justification for its
As Chief Justice Traynor stated: "A
judge must do more than decree; he must reason every inch of
the way."" Thus, judicial politics could be described as the
politics of reason rather than of power.s8
Professor Wechsler, in his famous dissertation on neutral
principles, declared that "[tlhe virtue or demerit of a judgment
turns . . . entirely on the reasons that support it and their adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees . . . ., 9 5 9 He
stressed that:
[a] principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons with
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that
is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of
the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course,

Archibald Cox probably best summarized the underlying concern when he observed that "[tlhe court's power to give its decisions the force of legitimacy ultimately depends in large measure
upon its professional artistry in weaving wise statecraft into the
fabric of law. . . ."'l He also wrote:
Court decrees draw no authority from the participation of the
people. . . . It comes, to an important degree, from the continuing force of the role of law-from the belief that the major influence in judicial decisions is not fiat but principles which
bind the judges as well as the litigants and which apply consistently among all men today, and also yesterday and
tornorro~~~
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

A. BICKEL,
supra note 12, at 69-70.
Id.
Traynor, supra note 12, at 11.
S. SCHIENGOLD,
supra note 12, at 37.
H. WECHSLER,
PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS
AND FUNDM~ENTAL
LAW 27 (1961).
Id.
A. Cox, THEWARREN
COURT
48 (1968).
Id. at 21, 22.
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The contemporary abortion controversy provides an excellent subject for a trial application of my model of tolerance limits on judicial activism. Before 1973 there was no "abortion doctrine" in American constitutional law. "The law" regarding
abortion consisted of the various statutes enacted by the state
legislatures, and that covered a tremendous range of positions.
The historic American rule had been that abortions were illegal
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. However,
between 1967 and 1972, responding to a popular reform movement, thirteen state legislatures revised their abortion laws to
follow the liberalized abortion provisions of the proposed Model
Penal Code (which allowed abortion in three exceptional situations-grave maternal health risk, felonious intercourse, and for
eugenic reasons (when the child might be born with a severe
mental or physical defect)). Four other states went even further
and effectively allowed abortion-on-demand during part of the
term of pregnancy. In the remaining American jurisdictions (approximately two-thirds of the states), abortion could be performed legally only when the mother's life (or, in some states,
her health) was endangered.
In 1973, after years of growing debate in the states, the
United States Supreme Court attempted to judicially resolve,
once and for all, the abortion controversy for the entire country.
~ Court announced that a fundamental right
In Roe v. W ~ d e , 'the
of privacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment protects the
decision of pregnant women whether or not to have an abortion.
The strictest standard of judicial scrutiny was held to apply to
laws infringing upon this right of abortion privacy. Reasoning
that unborn children are not "persons in the whole sense" and
are not entitled to legal protection before viability, the Court
fashioned a three-part constitutional rule regulating abortion.
The effect of Roe was to mandate, as a matter of constitutional
law, that states permit abortion-on-demand during at least the
first six months of pregnancy.44
The effect of Roe and its companion case Doe v. Bolton4'
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. For a more complete discwion of the holding and results of the 1973 abortion
DOCTRINE:
A COMPENDIUM
AND CRIdecisions, see L. WARDLE,THE ABORTION PRIVACY
TIQUE OF FEDERAL
COURTABORTION CASES(1980).
45. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

THE ABORTION DECISIONS

was revolutionary. All existing abortion laws (including all of the
recently liberalized abortion laws) were invalidated, wholly or in
part.46Instead of resolving the dispute, however, the Court's action appears to have intensified the controversy. Much of the
criticism of the Roe decision focuses upon its arbitrary approach
and its inconsistency with current and traditional social mores.47
Thus, the judicially created abortion doctrine presents an excellent opportunity for a contemporary case-study applying the
three limits on legitimate judicial activism that have just been
described.
Application of the tolerance limits on judicial activism to
the abortion controversy is predicated on one important assumption. I posit that the doctrine of abortion privacy is the result of judicial activism, i.e., that the abortion decisions of the
Supreme Court4. represent a gap-creating movement of the law
away from the moral order of society. Undoubtedly there was
some gap between pre-Roe abortion laws of the various states
and the moral order of society (as the success of abortion law
reform movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's demon. strated). But I am suggesting that Roe and its progeny have created a new and significantly wider gap between the law and
moral order than previously existed.
A. The Abortion Doctrine Is Unacceptable To Most
Members Of Society
The constitutional doctrine of abortion privacy spawned by
Roe is at least partially unacceptable to most members of society. And the abortion doctrine is strongly opposed by a significant minority of the American public.
Consider the following data: First, when the Supreme Court
decided Roe, legislation restricting abortion was already in effect
in all the states and territories. In fact, in two-thirds of the
46. See Moore, Moral Sentiment in Judicial Opinions on Abortion, 15 SANTA
CLARA
Law. 591, 633 (1975); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 Hmv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
47. See, e.g., A. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT
27-29 (1975); A. Cox, THE ROLE
OF THESUPREME
COURT
IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT
53, 113 (1976).
48. The "abortion decisions" of the United States Supreme Court include the following: Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v.
Roe, 432 US. 464 (1977);Bed v. Doe, 432 US. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973).
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states only "lifesaving" or "health preserving" abortions were legally permissible. The laws of these states were effectively invalidated by Roe. Another thirteen states had recently liberalized
their abortion laws and adopted the provisions of the Model Penal Code. Those provisions also were effectively declared to be
unconstitutional in Doe. Even the most liberal abortion laws
then in effect, which permitted abortion-on-demand during part
of the period of pregnancy, were unconstitutionally restrictive
under the doctrine of abortion privacy?
By itself, the invalidation of all existing abortion laws might
not necessarily suggest that the abortion decisions were unacceptable to a majority of Americans. After all, as conceded earlier, there was disparity between the pre-Roe abortion laws and
public morality. But during the five or six years before Roe virtually (if not literally) every state considered modification of its
existing abortion laws-and about one-third revised them. This
did not occur secretly. There was tremendous public interest
and political debate about abortion reform. In light of the attention that had been devoted to the issue, and the changes that
had been made through the political processes prior to 1973, the
effect of Roe to invalidate all of the laws does suggest that Roe
went beyond the contemporary moral order.
Second, ever since Roe was decided, state legislatures have
been extremely active in adopting legislation attempting to reinstate abortion restrictions. The same year the Supreme Court
decided Roe and Doe, thirty-nine different abortion bills responding to those decisions were passed by various state legisl a t u r e ~Six
. ~ ~years later, in 1979, another forty-one new abortion
laws were enacted by state legislatures." And in the seven years
since Roe was decided, one-half of all fertility related legislation
has concerned abortion. From 1973 through 1979, a total of 176
separate abortion bills were enacted into law by state
legislature^.^^
Third, public attitudes about abortion have remained virtually constant for the last eight years. A majority of Americans
disagree, a t least in part, with the abortion-on-demand rule established by the Supreme Court decision^.^ One survey compar49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See text at note 46 supra.
See 9 FAM.PLAN.& POPULATION
REP.15 (1980).
Id.
Id.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, at 49, col. 1; Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1980,

.
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ing attitudes between 1972 and 1976 about permitting abortions
for six different reasons found that the percentage of Aplericans
who approved of abortion had risen by a6 average of only four
percent in each of the six categories." (Although a large majority of those polled agreed that abortion should be legal in the
cases of serious danger to maternal health, rape, and when there
is a likelihood of serious defect in the baby, only one-half (fortyseven to fifty-four percent) agreed in 1976 that abortions should
be allowed for economic reasons, to avoid a stigma of unwed
motherhood, or to limit family size. In fact, the approval rates
for the abortion for the last four reasons have all fallen since the
1973-1974 period of peak abortion approvaP
Of even greater interest, the Gallup Poll has evaluated public opinion on a standard set of questions every year since the
Supreme Court decisions were rendered. The results for 1980 revealed that approximately twenty-five percent of the adults
questioned favored abortion-on-demand, approximately fiftyfive percent opposed abortion-on-demand but favored legalized
abortions in only certain circumstances, and about twenty percent of all adults polled would allow no legalized abortion except
when necessary to save maternal life? These figures are almost
the same (only four percent variation) as they were in 1973, the
year Roe was decided." Thus, there has been no statistically significant change in the public attitude about abortion since the
Supreme Court decisions. Even though significant minorities
strongly endorse or oppose the Supreme Court decisions in toto,
a large majority disagree with at least the most crucial element
of the abortion doctrine, i.e., abortion-on-demand.
Finally, the most important index of moral order regarding
political or social issues within society at any given time is probably the ballot box. Although the political process is very complex, and election results can easily be misinterpreted, the impact of abortion as an election issue cannot be ignored. In 1978,
six United States Senators were targeted for defeat by a rightto-life political action group, and all six were defeated. This included the stunning defeat of Senator Richard Clark of Iowa,
8 A, at 16, col. 1.
54. Tedrow & Mahoney, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion: 1972-1976, 43 PUB.

OPINION.
Q. 181, 183 (1979).
55. Id. at 183 (Table 1).
56. Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1980, 5 A, at 16, col. 1.
57. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, at 49, col. 1.
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and a "clean sweep" by pro-life candidates in the major political
races in Minnesotae5: In the 1980 primaries, Ronald Reagan's
pro-life position was one of the factors identified as contributing
to his sweep to victory, and that year the Republican Party became the first major American political party to call for a constitutional amendment for the purpose of reversing Roe as part of
the official party platform." (The stunning victory nationwide of
conservative, anti-abortion candidates in the 1980 general election60 also may evidence public dissatisfaction with the abortion
doctrine.)
Therefore, the judically created doctrine of abortion privacy
is probably unacceptable, at least in part, to a large majority of
the American public. However, this does not address the critical
question about legitimacy. The first tolerance limit on judicial
activism focuses on the other side of the issuewhether or not
the judical decision is supported by an active aqd influential
group in society. And the same statistics that show that the
abortion doctrine is at least partially unacceptable to most
Americans also reveal that it is strongly favored by a large minority (approximately twenty-five percent) of the American public, and that it is at least acceptable in part to the vast majority
of the public."' Similarly, such large and influential groups as
the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the American Civil Liberties Union, not to mention such smaller and more
partisan groups as the National Abortion Rights Action League,
have been extremely active in supporting the pro-abortion decisions of the Supreme Court." Thus, although the abortion decisions appear to be at least somewhat inconsistent with the moral
attitudes of most Americans, it does not appear that the abortion decisions have failed this standard of legitimacy because
they have been vigorously supported by an active and influential
group within society. As these pro-abortion groups have succeeded to date in at least offsetting the influence that the anti58. See, eg., Golden, Abortion's Morning After, N.Y. Times,Dec. 4, 1978, A, at
20. See also National Right to Life News, 11 (Dec. 1978); National Abortion Rights
Action League Newsletter, 1 (Dec. 1978).
59. 38 CONG.Q. WEEKLY
REP. 2034 (1980).
60. See National R i h t to Life News, (Nov. 10, 1980) (entire issue).
61. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
62. One need only look at the organizations that have been active as litigants or
amici curiae in the abortion cases to find evidence abundant that many influential organizations have actively supported-and aggressively encouraged expanding-the Roe
doctrine of abortion privacy.

8111

THE ABORTION DECISIONS

827

abortion groups have exerted upon strategically-placed decisionmakers within society, it would appear that the abortion decisions must be acknowledged to be legitimate on this basis.

B. The Supreme Court Has Exceeded Its Proper
Institutional Role In The ~ b o r t i o nCases
Not since the Supreme Court abandoned economic due process forty years ago has it been so widely criticized for engaging
in "social legislation" under the guise of interpreting the Constitution as it has for the abortion decisions. The abortion decisions were immediately and severely criticized by prestigious
constitutional scholars for their resurrection of substantive due
Prominent among these attacks have been the criticisms of commentators who favor liberalized abortion laws. For
example, in his acclaimed Yale Law Journal article condemning
the Court "not so much [because] it bungles the question it sets
itself, but rather [because] it sets itself a question the Constitution has not made the Court's business,"64 Professor John Hart
Ely paused to note, "Were I a legislator I would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court ends up drafting."6s Likewise, Alexander Bickel looked beyond his apparent personal
sympathy for the abortion policy the Court adopted, and criticized the Court for violating the institutional restraints on judicial action. He asked, "Should not the question then have been
left to the political process, which in state after state can achieve
not one but many accomodations, adjusting them from time to
time as attitudes change?"66
Other judges, including other federal judges, have criticized
the Court for exceeding its jurisdiction in deciding the abortion
cases. In response to the survey of a political science professor in
1975 and 1976, 165 federal judges and eighty-four state court
judges expressed their discomfort with the abortion decisions.
"Many judges in both samples labeled Roe v. Wade massive 'judicial legi~lation'."~~
Indeed, the rigid, formalistic, non-analytical
application of stare decisis in so many of the early, post-Roe,
63. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:A Comment On Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SUP.CT. REV.159.
64. Ely, supra note 63, at 943.
65. Id. at 926.
supra note 47, at 28.
66. A. BICKEL,
208, 212 (1977).
67. Caldeira, Judges Judge The Supreme Court, 61 JUDICATURE
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abortion decisions of the lower federal courts may have resulted
in part from the perception of federal judges that on this issue
the Supreme Court had really overdone it, and that the only way
the independence of the judiciary as an institution could be preserved in the face of widespread criticism would be by "closing
ranks" on the issue.68
At one time the argument was profferred that it was necessary for the Supreme Court to try to resolve the abortion controversy because the political processes were frozen and legislators
were "trapped" because the heavy "religious" overtones of the
abortion controversy prevented the political system from being
responsive to the desires of the citizenry for liberalized abortion
legislati~n.~~
This argument has now been abandoned by even its
chief proponent.70And it is just as well, for this theory simply
could not stand up under the facts. Pregnant women and others
who favored abortion liberalization were not denied the right to
register to vote. They were not kept away from the polls by
armed mobs. They were not barred from lobbying in the halls of
legislatures. Nor were their efforts doomed to futility because of
intrinsic inequities in the political system. Quite the contrary:
Register, vote, and lobby they did-with e x t r a o r d i ~ r ysuccess.
In light of the facts that one-third of the states adopted significantly liberalized abortion laws in the six-year span between
1967 and 1972, and that abortion liberalization was achieved
through both legislative enactment and popular referenda, it is
absurd to assert that judicial action was "necessary" in 1973 because the political process whs "frozen" by religious entanglement; that state legislators were "trapped;" or that the rights of
a discrete and insular minority needed to be protected by an
impartial and neutral judiciary.
Thus, it could easily be said that the Supreme Court exceeded its institutional limits when it "legislated" the abortion
decisions. But again, this fails to address the critical issue of
whether or not the abortion decisions have been perceived by
one of the co-equal branches of gqvernment as threatening their
institutional authority. And 9n this specific point, it appears
that the abortion decisions are quite safe-at least for the time
being. In the first place, the abortion debate was (and still is) so
68. See L. WARDLE,supra note 44, at 303.
69. Tribe, supra note 46, at 18-25.
LAW 928 (1978).
70. L. TRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONAL
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deeply controversial that, in the words of one distinguished
scholar, when the Supreme Court in 1973 stepped in and assumed responsibility for deciding the issue "[tlhe sighs of relief
as this particular albatross was cut from the legislative and executive necks seemed to me audible."'l
The action, or inaction, of the Congress and the President
since these Supreme Court decisions were rendered r e f i r m s
this assumption. Indeed, while Congress has solemnly listened to
a small army of witnesses complaining about the abortion decisions, and while numerous resolutions and dozens of bills have
been introduced calling for actions ranging all the way to constitutional amendments, virtually no legislative response has
emerged since 1976 except for the amendments to the annual
appropriations bills which limited public funding of abortions.
The dispute over public funding of abortions comes much
closer to the precipice. After all, the Constitution specifically
gives to Congress the power over the federal purse.72Thus, the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1977 abortion funding
cases, upholding the power of Congress to prohibit the public
funding of elective abortions," avoided a possible confrontation
with Congress on this point. And the 1980 public funding decisions,?' in which the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress even to refuse to subsidize certain "medically necessary"
abortions (i.e., abortions which are recommended for medical
reasons, but which are not necessary to save the life of the
mother), also avoided any appearance of a judicial usurpation of
congressional authority. Inasmuch as 238 members of Congress
(including more than a majority of the members of the House of
Representatives) filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme
Court in the 1980 Hyde Amendment case urging the Court not
to interfere with the operation of the Hyde Amendment, and arguing that Congress-not the Court-had the constitutional
duty to determine fiscal matters, including the extent of public
funding of abortions," the Court's decision upholding the Hyde
Amendment avoided a sure confrontation on this point.
71. Ely, supra note 63, at 947.
72. U.S. CONST.art. I, 5 7(1), 5 8(1).
73. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); B e d v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
74. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671
(1980).
75. Brief Amicus Curiae of Rep. Jim Wright, et. al., Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct.
2671 (1980).
b
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Thus, from 1973 to 1980 the Supreme Court apparently
avoided creating the perception among the coordinate branches
of government that it has usurped their powers. And even
though the Court probably has exceeded its judicial function (as
a matter of scholarly observation), so long as the members of
Congress and the President do not consider the Supreme Court
abortion decision to deprive them of any of their authority to
deal with politically desirable issues, the abortion decisions will
retain legitimacy on this point.76

C. The Opinions Of The Court In The Abortion Cases Are
Not Credible
Only on this point does it appear that the abortion decisions
have already fallen below the standard of legitimacy for judicial
activism. The Supreme Court opinions in the abortion cases are
so poorly reasoned that they fall below minimum standards of
acceptable legal analysis. In another context, inadequate legal
analysis in a Court opinion might be less important. But on an
issue that is so controversial, the failure of the Court to provide
a credible justification for its action is a grievous shortcoming.
The opinions of the Court in Roe and Doe have been condemned almost unanimously by legal scholars. Roe has been
criticized for the inadequacy of the "facts" on which it was
based:7 for the inadequacy of its consideration of vital constitutional concerns," for its resurrection of substantive due proces~,'~
for its absence of any "principled" annslysi~;~and for its
attempt to judicially mandate an absolute solution to a complex
76. However, if a Congress is elected that views the abortion decisions as an intolerable usurpation of legislative authority, or if the Supreme Court's decision in some future abortion case is so intransigent or doctrinaire as to create the fear that the Court
intends to exceed an acceptable degree of infringement on the legislative function, the
legitimacy of the abortion decisions on this point could quickly vanish.
77. See, e.g., Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORD.L. REV.807 (1973); Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a LifeProtective Amendment, 63 CALIF.L. REV. 1250 (1975); Witherspoon, Impact of the
Abortion Decisions Upon the Father's Role, 35 JUR. 32, 41-47 (1975).
78. See, e.g., A. Cox, supra note 47, at 53; Destro, supra note 77, at 1250-61; Ely,
supra note 63, at 923-26.
79. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 63, at 937-43; Epstein, supra note 63, at 159. See also
R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY
249-347 (1977); Tribe, supra note 46, a t 2.
80. See, e.g., A. BICKEL,supra note 47, at 27-29; Tribe,supra note 46, at 7; Ely,
supra note 63, at 943-47; J. NOWAIC,
R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW630TAKING
RIGHTSSERIOUSLY
123-30 (1977).
31 (1978). See also R. DWORKIN,
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political contr~versy.~'
Professor Bickel chastised the High Court for ruling by
judicial fiat and for failing to explain its reasoning: "One is left
to ask why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline to
which its function is properly subject. It simply asserted the result it reached.'"' Professor Ely wrote: "At times the inferences
the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution marks for
special protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never
before has its sense of an obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking."8s He further observed: "Roe lacks even colorable
support in the constitutional text, history, or any other appropriate source of constitutional doctrine . . . ."" Professor Ely
concluded his stinging analysis of Roe by observing that it "is
bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is
not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation
to try to be?
Professor Epstein commented that the Supreme Court's rationale for its abortion decisions was so poor that "[wlhat
seemed to make sense as a matter of principle to a lot of people
and a lot of lawyers is all of the sudden suspect."86 Professor
Cox summarized the criticisms well when he wrote:
My criticism of Roe v. Wade is that the Court failed to
establish the legitimacy of the decision by not articulating a
precept of specific abstractness to lift the ruling above the level
of political judgment . . . . Constitutional rights ought not to
be created under the Due Process Clause unless they can be
stated in principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots
throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic
political judgments of a particular time and place.87

Federal and state judges, surveyed three years after the
abortion decisions were announced, criticized the decisions for
the same reasons. "For these judges, the justices' opinions on
abortion in Roe lacked sufficient reasoning to justify this judicial
81. See, e.g., A. BICKEL,
supra note 47, at 27-29; Destro, supra note 77, at 1259-60,
Epstein, supra note 63, at 183-86. See also L. WARDLE,supra note 44 (Introduction).
supra note 47, at 28.
82. A. BICKEL,
83. Ely, supra note 63, at 936-37 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 943.
85. Id. at 947 (emphasis in original).
86. Epstein, supra note 63, at 179.
87. A. Cox, supra note 47, at 113-114.
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excursion into the field of morals."88
Clearly, then, the abortion opinions do not adequately justify the results reached. As examples of judicial craftsmanship,
the Roe and Doe opinions are an embarrassment to the profession. Unquestionably, the abortion decisions lack legitimacy on
this point.
This defect, alone, probably does not render the legal rules
established by the abortion decisions illegitimate. After all, the
quality of legal analysis is not a matter of first importance for
many persons outside legal circles. And, it must be admitted,
that even the most well-written and credibly analyzed opinion
dealing with such a controversial issue would incur the criticism
of activists favoring the losing side.
But the language of the law is not without significance. And
the language of the abortion decisions fails to motivate, or even
justify. When one considers the abortion doctrine and asks
"why," these cases do not provide a satisfying answer. There is
an emptiness here, a lack of principle and reason. When one
reads the abortion cases, one has the uneasy feeling that someday (perhaps soon) Roe and its progeny will come back to haunt
a new generation of Americans as did the Court's opinions in
Dred Scott v. Sanford,8@and Plessy u. Ferguson.@O

D. The Legitimacy of The Abortion Decisions
What does application of the model of tolerance limits reveal about the abortion decisions? It provides ,a tentative conclusion that the abortion decisions are currently "legitimate7'-so
far as that term has been used in this paper to mean compatibility with contemporary social mores, or being within the "gravitational field" surrounding the core moral order of society. Inasmuch as the abortion decisions are strongly supported by a
politically active minority in society (and are acceptable, in part,
to a substantial majority), and inasmuch as the political
branches of government do not now perceive any threat to their
authority, the judicially created doctrine of abortion privacy
passes the test of "legitimacy" in the context of the "gap" between the law and moral order in society. The fact that the
abortion decisions do not contain credible, much less persuasive,
88. Caldeira, supra note 67, at 212.
89. 60 U.S. (19 How.)393 (1857).
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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reasoning impairs the legitimacy of the abortion doctrine. The
Court's prestige and reputation probably have suffered, and perhaps we will see a more cautious judiciary in other cases in the
future. But the new law-the abortion doctrine-is substantially
legitimate, if only temporarily so.
The continuing abortion controversy underscores the fact
that law in a diverse, dynamic, politically responsive society is
always susceptible to change. Because a law-change is legitimate
does not suggest that it will be permanent. The abortion issue
still is very controversial; it may be the civil rights issue of the
1980's. While the doctrine of abortion privacy is legitimate now,
it may not be so in five years.
IV. CONCLUSION
The gap between the law and moral order of society is the
birthplace of political discontent. Because a judicially created
gap develops without the benefit of democratic participation, it
poses a special risk for exceeding the tolerance limits of society.
It also may constitute a threat to the legitimacy of the judiciary
as an institution. Therefore, it would be valuable to be able to
evaluate the legitimacy of the "gap" created by judicial activism.
I have proposed three tolerance limits for measuring judicial
activism: (1)The law-change must be supported by a politically
active and influential group in society; (2) it must not be perceived by other branches of government as usurping their powers; and (3) the articulated rationale for the law-change must be
credible. Applying these standards to a recent product of judicial activism, the abortion decisions, no major flaws in my model
are revealed. It also appears that the abortion doctrine passes
the first two tests, but fails the third. I would conclude that the
judicially created doctrine of abortion privacy presently is legitimate, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's
opinions, but that the judiciary (or, at least, judicial activism)
has suffered some loss of prestige, and the controversy
continues.
The remaining, difficult question is whether I have overlooked an essential element. Is there not a fourth factor required-a morality per se element? To be legitimate must not a
law or rule of law be moral in a larger sense than merely being
compatible with contemporary social attitudes? Are not some
values so fundamental that if they are negated by a law, however
popular it may be, that law is not legitimate? If so, what are
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these values? How are these values.to be identified? Who in our
society identifies them? In the abortion context, should the
"moral belief-acting to save life" defense be accepted as a valid
exculpating defense in cases where pro-life protestors are prosecuted for blocking access to abortion clinics?
My failure to address these intriguing questions does not result from a failure to appreciate that they have been asked and
must be considered. As my colleagues can readily attest, I hold a
very strong opinion about the morality of abortion: I believe that
it is a terribly immoral and cruel practice, fundamentally inconsistent with the very notion of law; it is the ultimate form of
invidious discrimination against the ultimately defenseless class.
But in this paper I have deliberately avoided addressing the
philosophical issue of rightness or wrongness. The scope of my
inquiry has been much more modest. I have attempted to examine the legitimacy of law, not the critical morality of it.
My approach is largely a result of my respect for the works
of such luminaries as H.L.A. Hart,B1Lon Fuller,g2and John Noonan,B3 and the belief that I can add little to what they have already said. It is also the result of my conviction that the most
important values in any system of secular law are procedural
(what Professor Fuller called the "inner morality of law"), and
that in a democracy one of the most fundamental of these is the
value of public participation in the formulation of substantive
laws.
Finally, I have focused on the legitimacy of the abortion privacy doctrine, in part, because of comments'some of my antiabortion friends have made suggesting that the abortion decisions are so immoral that they are not legitimate and need not
be obeyed. As both a supporter of our legal order system and a
critic of Roe u. Wade, I am convinced that it would be tragic for
anti-abortionists to adopt a policy of confrontation and civil disobedience because of an erroneous belief that the abortion decisions are not legitimate. While I agree that the abortion privacy
doctrine is an immoral rule of law which, if perpetuated in its
present form, could lead to an unprecedented American holo91. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.L. REV. 593
(1958).
92. Fuller,Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.L.
REV.630 (1958).
THEMORALITY
OF ABORTION:LEGALAND HISTORICAL
PERSPE~S
93. J. NOONAN,
(1970).
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caust of both physical and spiritual dimensions, I also believe
that there still exist many methods by wbich this judicial doctrine can be opposed and overturned without defying the law.
And to wantonly defy a legitimate law while established avenues
of redress are open would weaken our whole system of law and
jeopardize those very processes which historically have functioned successfully (if slowly) to repudiate immoral laws and
preserve a democratic legal order.

